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NOTES

Upsetting the Balance
IGNORING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
DOCTRINE IN COUNCIL OF NEW YORK V.
BLOOMBERG
I.

INTRODUCTION

A power shift occurred in New York State governments
during the winter of 2006, albeit without much fanfare and
without the benefit of a constitutional convention or
amendment.
Instead, the New York Court of Appeals1
(“Court”) issued its opinion in Council of New York v.
Bloomberg, a case arising out of a clash between the New York
City Council (“Council”) and Mayor Michael Bloomberg.2 The
ruling may have resolved the conflict, but it also challenged
pervasive notions concerning the roles of coordinate branches
of government under the doctrine of separation of powers.
Governmental authority in the United States, both
nationally and locally, is carefully allocated among distinct
departments to promote democracy and efficient governance.3
Conflicts between branches emerge when one branch interferes
with, circumvents, or ignores another branch’s inherent
authority, as delineated in the pertinent jurisdiction’s
Contravention of the intended
foundational document.4
allocation of governmental powers undermines democratic
principles by condoning a non-ratified reapportionment of
1
The Court of Appeals is the State’s highest court. GERALD BENJAMIN,
Structures of New York State Government, in DECISION 1997: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
IN NEW YORK 57, 65 (1997).
2
846 N.E.2d 433 (2006) [hereinafter Bloomberg].
3
See discussion infra Part II.A.
4
Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has
Indirectly Effected a Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689, 695 (2006).
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power.5 In order to ensure its advantages for democratic
governance, the doctrine of separation of powers obliges each
branch of government to operate within its delegated authority
and in accordance with the system of checks and balances
adopted under the applicable foundational document, whether
it be the federal or a state constitution or a city charter.6 Each
department owes due deference toward coordinate branches to
the extent reflected by these organizing principles.7
The distinct roles ascribed to individual governmental
departments enable qualitatively different risks to the existing
balance of power and engender unique responsibilities for the
preservation of established delegation of authority.
For
example, when other branches of government encroach upon
the function of the law-making body, not only is the accepted
structure of government subverted, but also the power of the
people’s most directly representative body is diminished.8 (The
rise of ever-stronger executive branches in American politics
Further, special
has recently highlighted this issue.9)
responsibility for the resolution of interbranch power struggles
is conferred to the judiciary as a result of its “province and
duty . . . to say what the law is.”10 Tension inevitably arises
when this coequal branch wields the power of judicial review—

5
See BENJAMIN, supra note 1, at 57 (“[A]rriving at an appropriate balance
among these institutions is one of the most significant decisions that faces constitution
makers.”).
6
This Note accepts this essentially formalist conception, which has been
adopted by many scholars and judges. See Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent,
Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers, 53 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 13 (2003).
It is also consistent, however, with a “functionalist” approach, at least where the
exercise of deference contributes to more efficient interbranch relations. See id.
7
BRADFORD P. WILSON, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review, in
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 63, 73-74 (1994) (“The weight of each
of the various parts in the constitutional balance depends on what the Constitution
delegates to it . . . .”).
8
See CHARLES O. JONES, SEPARATE BUT EQUAL BRANCHES: CONGRESS AND
THE PRESIDENCY 4 (1995) (maintaining the preeminent place of the legislative branch:
“Congress is the centerpiece of democracy”).
9
The topic of presidential encroachment upon the province of Congress has
received particularly widespread attention during the administration of George W.
Bush. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Power of One, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 24, 2006, at 8;
Andrew Sullivan, We Don’t Need a New King George: How Can the President Interpret
the Law as If It Didn’t Apply to Him? TIME, Jan. 23, 2006, at 74. See also John Yoo,
How the Presidency Regained Its Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 17, 2006 at D15 (offering a
favorable view of a more robust presidency). For commentary on the evolution of
increasingly powerful state executives, see Rogan Kersh et al., “More a Distinction of
Words Than Things”: The Evolution of Separated Powers in the American States, 4
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 5, 28-40 (1998).
10
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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to be the final arbiter of statutory meaning and constitutional
interpretation (including in cases concerning the constraints of
separated powers).11 Thus, the judiciary bears a heightened
responsibility to respect coordinate branches when exercising
this ultimate power.
The Bloomberg dispute involved a failure of both the
Mayor and the state’s judiciary to act in accordance with the
principles embodied by the doctrine of separation of powers.12
The outcome of the case illustrates how such failures can result
in a shift in the existing balance of power and a potentially less
After a breakdown in the
representative government.13
apparatus of applicable checks and balances, litigation between
the Council and Mayor Bloomberg led to the decision by the
state’s highest court expanding executive power at the expense
of legislatures across New York State.14
The conflict began in earnest when the Mayor refused to
enforce a local law, enacted by an override of his veto, on the
grounds that he believed the law was invalid.15 The measure
would have barred the City from entering into contracts for
goods or services unless the contractor extended the same
benefits to its employees’ domestic partners as it offered to
employees’ spouses.16 The Mayor initiated a legal challenge,
arguing that the law was preempted by state law and violated
the City Charter, and sought a temporary restraining order to
stay its implementation.17 Despite being denied the motion, the
Mayor declined to follow the law’s directive.18 The matter was
ultimately resolved when the Court affirmed the dismissal of a
mandamus proceeding initiated by the Council to enjoin the
Mayor to enforce the law.19 The Court’s decision undercut the
customary procedures for determining a law’s validity,
effectively denying the Council an evidentiary hearing to
support its case.20 The Bloomberg precedent effects a shift in
11
HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, Separation of Powers in the American Constitution,
in SEPARATION OF POWERS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT, supra note 7, at 3, 14.
12
See infra Part IV.
13
Id.
14
See Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 433.
15
See Sabrina Tavernise, Judge Rules Bloomberg Must Carry Out Equal
Benefits Law He Vetoed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at B3.
16
Id.
17
Roy L. Reardon & Mary Elizabeth McGarry, Cases Decided on Clergy
Sexual Abuse, Domestic Partner Benefits, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 10, 2006, at 3, col. 1.
18
Id.
19
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 435.
20
Id. at 445 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
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the balance of power in New York State and may well
embolden state and local executives to embrace unilateral
action when facing similar conflicts.21
To set the stage for a discussion of how the Bloomberg
decision undermines the principles of separation of powers,
Part II of this Note will briefly outline the purposes and
operation of the doctrine in American political theory, including
special consideration of the application of the doctrine in the
state and local contexts.
In Part III, the background,
procedural history, and ultimate resolution of the Bloomberg
case will be analyzed. A critical look at the case’s likely
detrimental impact will be discussed in Part IV. Finally, Part
V will present two ways in which these harmful effects might
be avoided or mitigated.
II.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

The American political heritage demonstrates an
unwavering practice of organizing governments that
implement the doctrine of separation of powers. The benefits of
this system, recognized by the Founding Fathers and their
successors, go beyond the checking function most often
associated with the doctrine. This structure, in which distinct
departments exercise their particular delegated powers while
operating within the constraints of their individual authority,
was also selected as the one most conducive to good
governance. The advantages that flow from this arrangement
and the institutional safeguards that govern interbranch
relations will be considered in this section, along with a
comparative view of the doctrine as it operates in the state
constitutional context.
A.

The Advantages of Separation of Powers

The early American statesmen formed governments of
distinct departments separated by functional roles.22 Drawing
mainly from Montesquieu and Locke, the Framers of both the
federal and state constitutions divided the power of their
respective governments among the now-familiar legislative,

21

See infra Part IV.A.
Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions
and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 211 (1989).
22
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executive, and judicial branches.23 The system adopted by the
Founders expanded upon existing conceptions of mixed
governments,
which
sought
balance
in
part
by
Rather than
institutionalizing existing social divisions.24
merely assuring that various interests received some voice in
the government, the Framers recognized that the fundamental
principle of popular sovereignty demanded that the new system
vest each branch with power derived from the people as a
Thus, they formed a complex arrangement of
whole.25
departments organized by core roles and responsibilities, but
one that represented a “balance of constitutional orders or
powers, blended with a constitutional differentiation of
functions.”26
The Founders advanced two main categories of
advantages of the divided government structure they proposed,
one predominantly cautionary and one more effectual.27 First,
by dividing government operations into separate functional
departments, proponents argued that consolidation of power
Second, enhanced
would be institutionally deterred.28
efficiencies and more varied constituency representation would
be
achieved
through
functional
specialization
and
compartmentalized institutional roles.29
1. The Diffusion of Power
Primarily, the separation of powers doctrine is an
instrument to diffuse power throughout the government.30
Preventing the accumulation of authority within any individual
or body lessens the opportunity for abuse of power and political
oppression.31 This benefit follows both as a matter of structure
as well as in the operation of departments carrying out

23

See MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 5-10.
WILSON, supra note 7, at 72-73.
25
Casper, supra note 22, at 216.
26
WILSON, supra note 7, at 73 (quoting HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE
ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 62 (1981)).
27
MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 10. These categorical distinctions have been
described as “negative” and “positive” functions of the doctrine. Peabody & Nugent,
supra note 6, at 22.
28
See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
29
See infra Part II.A.2.
30
MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 3.
31
JAMES W. CEASER, Doctrines of Presidential-Congressional Relations, in
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT, supra note 7, at 89, 93.
24
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logically interrelated roles.32 In a nation of laws where
different bodies are responsible for law making, law
enforcement, and adjudication, the people have recourse
against a rogue branch of government that attempts to exert its
power improperly, through the checking functions of the other
branches.33 Thus, for example, legislatures have the primary
power to enact laws, but it is the executive who has the
responsibility of enforcement, and only the judiciary may apply
the laws in specific cases and controversies.34 In addition to the
inherent safeguard of this general division of labor, overreach
from one office would be countered by the natural jealousies of
coordinate branches.35 As James Madison succinctly put it in
one of the numerous Federalist Papers addressing the
separation of powers, “Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition.”36 It is this acknowledged tendency to resist the
efforts of counteracting branches’ attempts to test the
boundaries of granted power that provides an inherent
checking function in a divided system.37
2. Promoting the Effectiveness of Government
The second group of benefits that results from
separation of powers derives from the efficiency advantages
gained by allocating specific powers to departments uniquely
suited to them.38 Among these advantages are the wider array
of personalities who may be gainfully exploited in successful
governance,39 the ability of diverse departments to represent a
wider array of interests,40 and the positive effects of multiple
constituency representation.41 When each branch is tailored to
its role within the overall scheme, the result is a whole that can
32

Id. at 92-93.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324-27 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) (describing Montesquieu’s warning that there can be no liberty when
the same body may exercise the distinct powers of the executive, legislator, and judge).
34
Carl Levin & Elise J. Bean, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter of
Public Confidence and Constitutional Balance, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 18 (1987).
35
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 33, at 347-48
(“[Branches would be restrained] by so contriving the interior structure of the
government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the
means of keeping each other in their proper places.”).
36
Id. at 349.
37
MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 11.
38
TOM CAMPBELL, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN PRACTICE 19-26 (2004).
39
CEASER, supra note 31, at 93-94.
40
Id.
41
Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 22-23.
33
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be, at once, stable, cautious, and wise while also energetic,
responsive, and adaptive.42 As Bruce G. Peabody and John D.
Nugent wrote in their recent article, “[S]eparation of powers
ties different functions and traits essential for governance and
different kinds of power to distinct institutions in order to
promote
accountability,
effective
policymaking
and
administration, and political legitimacy, among other goals.”43
B.

The Role of Checks and Balances and the Interplay of
Government Branches

A divided government’s organizational structure does
more than allocate broad functional roles to various
departments; it also establishes the mechanisms that delineate
how and to what extent the branches interact in the day-to-day
operations of government.44 Despite some of the overheated
rhetoric from some of the Founding Fathers,45 a rigid
compartmentalization into legislative, executive, and judicial
functions was never anticipated.46 Rather, interplay among
branches was expected and encouraged, to the end of achieving
the most responsible and representative exercise of power.47
These interactions are largely taken into account within the
framework of the Constitution.48 They are managed through
carefully selected forms of checks and balances, such as the

42

MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 12-13.
Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 34.
44
MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 11.
45
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 33, at 324
(“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”), NO. 48, at 333
(James Madison) (“The legislative department is every where extending the sphere of
its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”); John Adams, Letter to
Jefferson (Mar. 1, 1789), 14 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 599 (Julian P. Boyd ed.
1955), quoted in Leslie Southwick, Separation of Powers at the State Level:
Interpretations and Challenges, 72 MISS. L.J. 927, 942 (2003) (“That greatest and most
necessary of all Amendments, the Separation of the Executive Power, from the
Legislative, . . . [w]ithout this our Government is in danger of being a continual
struggle between a Junto of Grandees, for the first Chair.”).
46
CEASER, supra note 31, at 94-95.
47
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 33, at 332 (“I shall
undertake in the next place, to shew that unless these departments be so far connected
and blended as to give to each a constitutional controul over the others, the degree of
separation which the maxim requires as essential to a free government, can never in
practice be duly maintained.”).
48
Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 26.
43
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President’s veto power, the Senate’s confirmation power, and
the House’s impeachment power in the federal Constitution.49
These checks and balances work at the frontiers of each
branch’s authority and define the manner in which each branch
may assert itself into the workings of the others, as
contemplated by the founding document.50 Some commentators
perceive this interaction as a limited sharing of allocated
powers that improves decision-making, albeit at some cost to
efficiency.51 Even those who adhere to the idea that robust
interplay has a largely positive effect on governance concede
that the systemic checks help define undue encroachment so
that the branches can legitimately defend themselves.52
Ultimately, then, checks and balances provide specific
parameters of the constitutional constraints on power of any
one department operating in the traditional area of another.53
C.

Separation of Powers in State Constitutions

State constitutions also embody the separation of
powers doctrine via their establishment of divided
governments. It has been noted, however, that an analysis
tailored to the state’s individual context is appropriate.54 This
is partly because the details of power allocation within state
governments differ from those of the federal government, but a
distinctive analysis also may be necessary due to the historical
context of a state constitution’s origin and evolution.55
While states are under no obligation under the federal
Constitution to observe any particular formulation of separated
powers,56 all fifty state constitutions reflect the same basic
tripartite structure as the federal model.57 And many explicitly
49

Id.
See CEASER, supra note 31, at 94-97.
51
Id. at 95-96.
52
See MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 13.
53
Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 26.
54
See generally Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of
Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (1999);
G. Alan Tarr, Symposium Article, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State
Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329 (2003).
55
Tarr, supra note 54, at 340.
56
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he
distribution of powers among the branches of a State’s government raises no questions
of federal constitutional law . . . .”).
57
RICHARD BRIFFAULT, Principal Provisions of State Constitutions: A Brief
Overview, in DECISION 1997: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN NEW YORK, supra note 1, at
21, 21.
50
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provide for a strictly distinct allocation of powers among three
For example, Kentucky’s first constitution
branches.58
provided:
§ 1. The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct
departments, each of them to be confided to a separate body of
magistracy, to wit: those which are legislative to one, those which
are executive to another, and those which are judiciary to another.
§ 2. No person, or collection of persons, being of one of these
departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of
the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.59

Other states’ constitutions, like the federal Constitution,
simply imply separation principles through organizational
structure.60 This fundamental difference could inform a court’s
evaluation of the propriety of certain government interactions.61
An incursion by one branch into the arena of another in a state
governed by a provision like that in Kentucky’s constitution
might be subject to more stringent scrutiny than one occurring
in a state where the separation of powers doctrine is merely
implied.62
States have also adopted their own systems for
allocating and constraining power, and shaped their own
approaches for governing the interplay of government
branches. Such controls may include idiosyncratic limitations
on legislative authority, organizational complexities, and
uncommon checks and balances compared to those at the
federal level.63 For example, many states divide executive
duties into separate offices, such as that of a state attorney
general, secretary of state, and treasurer.64 Line item65 and

58
Some forty state constitutions currently include explicit separation
language. Tarr, supra note 54, at 337.
59
KY. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 2 (1792). The text remains largely unchanged
today. KY. CONST. §§ 27, 28 (1891). It has been suggested that this language came
from Thomas Jefferson, who drafted a 1783 proposed constitution for Virginia that is
nearly identical. See Southwick, supra note 45, at 940-44.
60
See supra note 58.
61
Id. at 338.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 337-38.
64
Id. at 338.
65
Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1171,
1171 (1993).
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legislative vetoes66 are examples of measures that regulate
interbranch relations which are, for now, unique to states.67
Beyond such textual interpretation, there is perhaps a
more fundamental distinction to be drawn between the state
and federal perspective arising from the principles of
sovereignty and federalism.68 This difference follows from the
fact that all federal authority came at the acquiescence of the
sovereign states.69 Thus, the federal Constitution confers
powers to the federal government, whereas states’ constitutions
marshal plenary power, and are therefore fundamentally
documents of limitation.70 Consequently, restrictions upon
state legislatures are commonly found in state constitutions
that would be unnecessary to keep Congress’ limited powers in
check.71 In this manner, for example, a state may rely less on
interbranch checks than on more direct constraints of
legislative authority.72
Another factor to bear in mind when analyzing state
government organization is the change in prevailing attitudes
toward state governments. Although the Antifederalists, for
example, were profoundly concerned by an encroachment on
state sovereignty,73 local legislatures were not considered to
present a similar threat to liberty.74 Direct representation by a
“legislative assembly composed of one’s friends and neighbors,
which met briefly and was subject to annual popular election”
did not warrant the same degree of vigilance or institutional
safeguards.75 Thus, state constitutions in the 18th and early
19th centuries rarely exhibited the “delicate balance”

66

Tarr, supra note 54, at 337.
Both of these mechanisms have proven problematic at the federal level: a
presidential line item veto and a congressional legislative veto were struck down in
Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 420-21 (1998), and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
959 (1983), respectively, as violating the separation of powers under the federal
constitution.
68
See Tarr, supra note 54, at 329.
69
16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 5 (1998).
70
Tarr, supra note 54, at 329-30.
71
Id.; see also RICHARD BRIFFAULT, State Constitutions in the Federal
System, in DECISION 1997: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 3,
9-19.
72
Tarr, supra note 54, at 329-30.
73
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James
Madison and the Founders’ Search for a Workable Balance Between Federal and State
Power, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1276 (1989).
74
Tarr, supra note 54, at 334.
75
Id.
67
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enshrined in the federal Constitution.76
Rather, strong
legislatures and comparatively weak, often appointed,
executives were the norm.77 Whereas it has come to be
accepted in the federal context that “none of the several
departments is subordinate, but that all are coordinate,
independent, and coequal,”78 this was rarely the situation
established by early state constitutions.
Over time, however, state constitutional reform brought
forth a more equitable distribution of power among
governmental departments.79 Populist reforms of the 19th
century80 and the rise of stronger executives in the early 20th
century resulted in considerably more balanced state
governments.81 Many of the measures that advanced this more
balanced organization were adopted for essentially the same
purpose as the checks and balances incorporated in the federal
Constitution—to constrain abuses of power by single factions
within the government.82 This state constitutional evolution
toward government in counterpoise may be viewed as a further
tacit endorsement of the separation doctrine.83
However similar to the federal system a state’s
government may appear, when analyzing a case implicating
the separation of powers doctrine, the state’s constitutional
history and the development of its political institutions are
paramount to the analysis.84
D.

The Separation of Powers Context of Council of New
York v. Bloomberg

The events surrounding the New York Court of Appeals
decision that is the subject of this Note involve both state and
76
For example, the governor under New York’s first constitution has been
described as “a mere ‘sentinel’ who had virtually no relationship to the actual daily
business of governing New York.” John T. Buckley, The Governor—From Figurehead
to Prime Minister: A Historical Study of the New York State Constitution and the Shift
of Basic Power to the Chief Executive, 68 ALB. L. REV. 865, 869 (2005).
77
Tarr, supra note 54, at 334.
78
16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 246 (1998).
79
Tarr, supra note 54, at 334-35.
80
For example, in a number of states reformists provided for direct election
of previously appointed officials, such as governors, and imposed a plethora of
restrictions on legislatures. See id.
81
See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 76, at 868-76.
82
These included direct election of executive offices and judicial seats, as well
as restrictions on legislative action on certain subjects. Tarr, supra note 54, at 334-35.
83
BENJAMIN, supra note 5, at 57.
84
Rossi, supra note 54, at 1240.
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local governmental organization, as established by the
Constitution of the State of New York and the New York City
Charter.
Although this conflict primarily concerned a
municipal governmental dispute, the separation of powers
principles at issue implicate both state and city foundational
documents. This follows both because the City is organized
under powers granted by the state constitution85 and because
the state constitution establishes a unified system for all courts
in the state.86 There is no judicial branch represented in the
New York City Charter.87 Thus, state courts adjudicated the
matter, and the Court of Appeals’ holding is binding across the
state. This section will first discuss separation of powers as
reflected in New York State history and law, and then will
outline the governmental organizational framework pertinent
to Bloomberg.
1. Separation of Powers and the New York State
Constitution
The Constitution of New York State reflects a number of
the concepts discussed in the previous section. For example, it
implicitly separates governmental power into three main
branches, but uses no explicit language in establishing the
division,88 and it features a somewhat dispersed executive
branch in that the governor, attorney general, and comptroller
are independently elected officials.89 Despite these checks, over
the history of the state, the governor’s office has evolved into a
quite powerful post through constitutional change.90 One of the
most significant redistributions of power in the state came
when New York amended its constitution to grant the governor
a preeminent role in setting the state’s budget.91
Legal challenges involving the budgetary process
illustrate the New York Court of Appeals’ view on the operation
85

See infra Part II.D.2.
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 1(a) (McKinney 2006).
87
See LaGuardia v. Smith, 41 N.E.2d 153, 155 (N.Y. 1942). See generally
N.Y. CITY CHARTER (2004).
88
BENJAMIN, supra note 5, at 57-58.
89
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, New York’s State Constitution in Comparative
Context, in DECISION 1997: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 29,
36-37. Also notable is the role of the lieutenant governor, who is elected with the
governor but presides over the state senate with a casting vote. BENJAMIN, supra note
5, at 58, 64.
90
See generally Buckley, supra note 76.
91
Id. at 884-85.
86
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of separation of powers issues in New York State.92 The Court’s
opinions evidence the kind of tailored analysis appropriate in
the state context.93 The amendment, enacted in 1928, gave
New York’s executive the exclusive power to draft budget
legislation.94 The legislature was thereafter restricted to four
responses to a governor’s proposed budget: to “(1) approve the
comprehensive budget . . .; (2) eliminate or (3) reduce proposed
appropriations; or (4) add appropriations, but only if done
separately and distinctly, and only if referring to a single object
Because the budgeting function is so
or purpose.”95
fundamentally intertwined with policymaking, legislativeexecutive clashes over the new process began making their way
up to the Court of Appeals almost immediately, and they
continue to do so.96
In adjudicating the early budget cases, the Court
unsurprisingly ratified the idea that a constitutional
reallocation of power was permissible and binding on the
governmental departments.97 A recent contribution to the
Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence comes from Silver v.
Pataki.98 In that case, the legislature attempted to pass
legislation outside the budget process to circumvent the
governor’s power to exercise line-item vetoes of appropriations
In one measure for example, the
within the budget.99
lawmakers conditioned the release of appropriated funds to
build a prison on the inclusion of on-site facilities for inmate
educational and other services.100 The Court invalidated the
legislative acts because they infringed on the governor’s
constitutional power to have his budget provisions accepted or
rejected but not altered.101 The Court, however, acknowledged
that the extent to which policymaking power accompanied the
transfer of budgeting authority was a closer question, and
opined that certain nonfiscal items would be inappropriate
92

Buckley, supra note 76, at 886.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
94
Buckley, supra note 76, at 883.
95
Id. at 885 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 4).
96
See, e.g., People v. Tremaine, 168 N.E. 817 (N.Y. 1929); Pataki v. N.Y.
State Assembly, 824 N.E.2d 898 (N.Y. 2004).
97
Id. at 889 (citing Tremaine, 168 N.E. at 825).
98
Pataki v. N.Y. State Assembly (consolidating Silver v. Pataki), 824 N.E.2d
898, 902-03 (N.Y. 2004).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 904-05.
93
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subjects of a governor’s budget appropriation.102 Thus, despite
its obligation to uphold the executive budgeting amendment,
the Court recognized the tension operating against an
interpretation of separated powers that ceded a natural role of
the legislative body to another department.103 The Court also
declared its continuing reluctance to draw a bright line
delineating gubernatorial and legislative powers.104 Silver v.
Pataki exemplifies the kind of customized separation of powers
analysis that must be employed at the state level.105 The case
continues the Court’s acknowledgment of the relevance of the
separation of powers doctrine, as embodied by the state
constitution, to the analysis of interdepartmental conflicts.106
2. The New York State Constitution’s Home Rule
Article and the New York City Charter
The doctrine of separation of powers is also applied in
some local governments. Although many towns, villages, and
small cities are organized around largely administrative
bodies, others reflect the structure of larger governmental
entities.107 The New York City Charter, adopted pursuant to
the state constitution’s provision for “home rule,” governs local
government organization and administration.108 The Charter

102
Id. at 909. The Court hypothesized, for example, that a governor may not
impose a retirement age on firefighters by making appropriations to fire departments
conditioned on acceptance of the rule or otherwise subvert state statutes in an
appropriations bill. Id. at 907.
103
See Buckley, supra note 76, at 902-04 (contrasting the widely differing
positions taken by the plurality, concurrence, and dissent on demarcating the
governor’s power of appropriation).
104
Pataki, 824 N.E.2d at 910.
105
For a contemporaneous account of the impact of this litigation on New
York State separation of powers doctrine, see generally The Committee on State
Affairs, The New York State Budget Process and the Constitution: Defining and
Protecting the “Delicate Balance Of Power,” 58 THE RECORD OF THE ASS’N OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 345 (2003).
106
For New York State Court of Appeals decisions rooted in the separation of
powers, see, for example, Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 798
N.E.2d 1047, 1049 (N.Y. 2003); Bourquin v. Cuomo, 652 N.E.2d 171, 173 (N.Y. 1995);
Clark v. Cuomo, 486 N.E.2d 794, 797 (N.Y. 1985).
107
Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the
Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2544-45 (2006);
EDWARD N. COSTIKYAN & MAXWELL LEHMAN, RESTRUCTURING THE GOVERNMENT OF
NEW YORK CITY 56-57 (1972).
108
ADRIENNE KIVELSON, WHAT MAKES NEW YORK CITY RUN? 19 (The League
of Women Voters of the City of N.Y. Educ. Fund 3d ed. 2001).
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distributes power between two distinct departments, which
have been granted limited authority.109
Article 9 of the New York State Constitution (“Home
Rule”) sets forth the state legislature’s power to create local
governments, with the stated purpose of establishing
democratic, self-governing bodies that are responsive to local
matters.110 The Home Rule article largely cedes control of
regional matters to the localities.111 By this provision, the New
York State Constitution grants specific powers to localities,
allows the state legislature to grant additional ones, and
constrains State interference with certain local issues.112
Specifically, the Home Rule article confers self-government
upon the people of a local jurisdiction through a representative
legislative body.113 But provision for the formation of local
governments is only vaguely stated: “[t]he legislature shall
provide for the creation and organization of local governments
in such manner as shall secure to them the rights, powers,
privileges, and immunities granted to them by this
constitution.”114 Thus, localities have considerable flexibility in
certain areas, including the organization of local government.115
Pursuant to the authority granted by the Home Rule
article, the Charter of the City of New York establishes two
branches of government and assigns them particular
functions.116 The mayor is the “chief executive officer of the
city.”117 The City Council is “vested with the legislative power
of the city.”118 This legislative role is underscored by the
succeeding sentence: “Any enumeration of powers in this
charter shall not be held to limit the legislative power of the
council, except as specifically provided in this charter.”119 In
fact, the Charter provides explicit protection of allocated

109

N.Y. CITY CHARTER §§ 3, 21.
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
111
Id.
112
Id. §§ 1-3; see RICHARD BRIFFAULT, Intergovernmental Relations, in
DECISION 1997: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 155, 156.
113
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
114
Id. § 2(a).
115
BRIFFAULT, supra note 112, at 156-57.
116
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 2(c)(1); N.Y. CITY CHARTER §§ 3, 21.
117
N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 3.
118
Id. § 21.
119
Id.
110
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authority by requiring any law that diminishes the powers
vested in a city official to be ratified by the voters.120
There is ample justification to apply the separation of
powers doctrine under the New York City Charter. The clear
expression of representative self-determination in the Home
Rule article along with the explicit allocation of powers and the
protections accorded the two branches in the Charter strongly
suggest the relevance of the doctrine. The courts of New York
State have almost universally subscribed to this view, and have
assumed that separation principles apply to municipal
organizations when adjudicating related matters.121
III.

COUNCIL OF NEW YORK V. BLOOMBERG

The circumstances surrounding Bloomberg are notable
for the example of unilateral executive action, but this case will
also be remembered for the presumptuousness of the judicial
response and the disruption in the operation of separation of
powers doctrine in New York State the Court sanctioned.122
Indeed, the very fact that the judiciary upended traditional
procedures for adjudicating the validity of a local law to resolve
this interbranch conflict may be seen as an affront to the
democratic principles inherent to the workings of divided
government.123

120
A local law must be submitted for referendum if it “[a]bolishes, transfers or
curtails any power of an elective officer.” Id. § 38(5); see also N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE
LAW § 23(2)(f) (McKinney 1994) (same).
121
Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., 789 N.Y.S.2d 860, 862 (Sup. Ct. 2004);
Under 21 Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children v. City of N.Y., 482 N.E.2d 1,
4-5 (N.Y. 1985). But see LaGuardia v. Smith, 41 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1942); Jennings v.
N.Y. City Council, 814 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Table), No. 111597/05, 2006 WL 140399 (Sup. Ct.
2006). The LaGuardia and Jennings courts rejected the doctrine’s applicability in the
case of a municipality because a city within New York State is not a sovereign entity,
but rather operates solely on authority granted by the State. LaGuardia, 41 N.E.2d at
155-56; Jennings, 2006 WL 140399, at *3-4. Neither court explains precisely why the
City’s lack of sovereignty is fatal to establishing a subordinate government of separated
powers. Indeed, as discussed in Part II.C, it was the sovereign states that granted the
powers allocated in the U.S. Constitution (in which the separation of powers doctrine,
of course, is firmly rooted). See also Recent Decisions, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1217-21
(1942) (suggesting, in the wake of LaGuardia, that even if the doctrine does not apply
to cities, the form of New York City’s government under its charter implies a vigorous
independence of its two branches).
122
See Brief for the Brennan Ctr. for Just. at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d
433 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 115214/04), 2005 WL 3818168 [hereinafter Brennan Ctr. Brief].
123
See infra Part IV.A.
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The Ill-Fated Equal Benefits Law

On May 5, 2004, the New York City Council passed The
Equal Benefits Law (“EBL”), which prohibited the City from
entering into certain contracts with companies that fail to
provide employees’ domestic partners the same benefits
received by employees’ spouses.124 Similar measures had been
adopted in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.125 Mayor
Bloomberg, while generally supportive of expanding rights
afforded to domestic partners, vetoed the measure.126 He was
concerned about the negative effect of the law on the City’s
finances, and stated that he did not want “to use the city’s
buying power to legislate social issues.”127 The Council overrode
the veto by a vote of forty-one to four.128 Claiming the
ordinance was preempted by local, state, and federal laws, the
Mayor instigated a declaratory judgment action to have the law
Additionally, to avoid “confusion and
invalidated.129
uncertainty on the part of contractors who would be unsure as
to the validity of the law or the rules under which the City’s
procurement system was operating,” the Mayor moved for a
temporary restraining order to stay implementation of the law
until a decision was made.130
Up to this point in the developing quarrel, the checks
and balances incorporated in the Charter operated along
familiar lines. Despite a shared belief in a laudable end, the
two branches of city government disagreed on the propriety of
this particular means.131 The Mayor declined to sign the law he
opposed, and exercised his veto pursuant to the City Charter.132
The Council duly overrode his veto, thereby automatically
124
See New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 27 (2004), available at
http://www.nyccouncil.info/pdf_files/bills/law04027.pdf; NEW YORK, N.Y., CITY ADMIN.
CODE § 6-126 (2005) (New York Legislative Serv. 2005), invalidated by Council of N.Y.
v. Bloomberg, 791 N.Y.S.2d 107 (App. Div. 2005), aff’d, Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433.
The ordinance affected any contractor who entered into agreements with the City
amounting to over $100,000 over a year period. Id.
125
Epstein Becker & Greene, P.C., & Robyn Rudeman, Domestic-Partner
Benefits: The Trend Continues, N.Y. EMP. LAW LETTER, Aug. 2004.
126
Id.
127
Sabrina Tavernise, Council Will Seek to Reinstate Law Giving Partners
Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at B4.
128
Local Law No. 27.
129
See Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 436.
130
Brief of Respondent at 9, Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433
(N.Y. 2006) (No. 115214/04), 2006 WL 499294.
131
Id. at 7.
132
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 37.
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enacting the law.133 Next, the Mayor pursued his unquestioned
right to contest the law’s validity through an established legal
vehicle: an action for declaratory judgment.134 Both parties’
actions fell within the conception of New York State’s
separation of powers framework; the same cannot be said,
however, for what came after.
B.

The Article 78 Proceeding and Appeals

Although the New York Supreme Court135 refused the
Mayor’s request to stay implementation of the EBL, the Mayor
nevertheless refused to enforce the law, unilaterally
proclaiming it to be invalid.136 The Mayor declared instead his
intent to comply with the laws he felt preempted the EBL.137 In
response, the Council filed an Article 78 proceeding in the
nature of mandamus to compel138 on October 26, 2004, the day
the EBL was to take effect.139
On November 8, 2004, the New York Supreme Court
granted the Council’s request based on the presumption of
validity accorded to legislative enactments,140 and ordered the
Mayor to enforce the law,141 but the Mayor still refused to
comply and filed an appeal.142 Four months later, the Appellate
133
Id. (“If after such reconsideration the votes of two-thirds of all the council
members be cast in favor of repassing such local law, it shall be deemed adopted,
notwithstanding the objections of the mayor.”).
134
Reardon & McGarry, supra note 17, at 3.
135
In New York State, the Supreme Court is the trial court. FREDERICK
MILLER, New York State’s Judicial Article: A Work in Progress, in DECISION 1997:
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 127-28.
136
Reardon & McGarry, supra note 17, at 3.
137
Id.
138
Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) governs
the special proceedings that are used to bring any action formerly brought under the
writs of mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari. Alexander, Practice Commentaries,
McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR C7801:1, at 25 (1994). When a body or
officer fails “to perform a duty enjoined upon it by law . . . an Article 78 proceeding in
the nature of mandamus is generally the appropriate remedy, provided that the relief
is sought to compel the performance of an official duty that is clearly imposed or
mandated by statute . . . .” 6 N.Y. JUR. 2D Article 78 and Related Proceedings § 47
(1997). The petitioner must demonstrate a “clear legal right” to the relief sought. Id.
§ 72.
139
New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 27 (2004).
140
See Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 436.
141
Tavernise, supra note 15, at B3. The judgment was entered December 1,
2004. See Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 791 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (App. Div. 2005).
142
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 14, Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 846
N.E.2d 433 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 115214/04), 2005 WL 3818161 [hereinafter Council’s
Brief].
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Division reversed the Supreme Court’s judgment and dismissed
the proceeding, finding that the lower court had erred by not
addressing the issue of the validity of the EBL raised by the
Mayor.143 While admitting that “[a]n article 78 proceeding is
not the remedy for adjudicating the validity of legislative
enactments,” the Appellate Division held that the law’s validity
should have been addressed.144 The court also stated that not
considering the merits of the case would defeat “a principal
purpose of bringing the writ of mandamus, i.e., obtaining a
prompt, due resolution of the controversy.”145 In the decision’s
succeeding two short paragraphs, the court found that the EBL
was preempted by a state law that provides that government
contracts must be granted to the lowest responsible bidder and
by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”).146
The Council appealed this ruling, arguing both that the
Appellate Division erred in addressing the validity of the law,
and also that the EBL was not preempted by either statute.147
On February 14, 2006, the New York State Court of Appeals, in
a four-to-three split decision, affirmed the dismissal, effectively
invalidating the law on the same grounds as the court below.148
C.

Discussion and Analysis of the Court of Appeals’
Decision

The Court divided on the issue of whether the validity of
the law was appropriately raised as a defense to the Article 78
proceeding.149 It had been consistently held by the Court that
an Article 78 proceeding is not an appropriate vehicle to

143

Council of N.Y., 791 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
Id. at 109 (quoting Giuliani v. Council of N.Y., 181 Misc. 2d 830, 834 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1999)). The rule limiting the scope of Article 78 proceedings is well-settled law
outside certain exceptions, such as challenges of quasi-legislative acts by governmental
agencies, see N.Y. City Health and Hosp. Corp. v. McBarnette, 639 N.E.2d. 740 (N.Y.
1994), and challenges based on as-applied unconstitutionality, see Kovarsky v. Hous. &
Dev. Admin. of the City of N.Y., 286 N.E.2d 882 (N.Y. 1972). See also infra note 150.
145
Council of N.Y., 791 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
146
Id. at 109-10. The primary state statute considered was section 103(1) of
the New York General Municipal Law (the “competitive bidding statute”), and the
court specified section 1144(a) and (c)(2) of ERISA as preempting the EBL. Id. at 110.
147
A discussion of the Majority’s preemption analysis is postponed until Part
III.C.2, following a critique of the controversial procedural issue in Part III.C.1.
148
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 435.
149
Reardon & McGarry, supra note 17, at 3.
144
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challenge the validity of a law.150 However, the Bloomberg
Majority distinguished previous cases where it was the
petitioner who challenged a law’s validity; here, the respondent
raised the issue as a defense.151 The Court reasoned that
because a writ of mandamus should never be granted to force
the government to perform an illegal act, a court could rule on
a law’s validity when raised in this context.152 The Majority
then proceeded to affirm the Appellate Division’s holding that
state and federal statutes preempted the EBL.153
The dissenting judges found the ruling to be an
unacceptable encroachment upon legislative authority.154
Rejecting the idea that, even when denied a restraining order,
the Mayor could choose to ignore legislative enactments upon
his own determination that a law is invalid, they maintained,
commensurate with the general rule, that an Article 78
proceeding was an inadequate vehicle for a decision on the
Establishing this new precedent, they
law’s validity.155
concluded, represented a clear violation of separation of
powers.156 It “skews the roles of the legislative and executive
branches” by allowing the Mayor to “infringe upon the
legislative powers reserved to the City Council” and “to
determine, in the first instance, whether a law is valid, and
thereby clothe the executive with not only legislative but
judicial powers.”157 As reported in the New York Law Journal,

150
As the Bloomberg Dissent noted, “[A] petitioner who challenges the validity
of legislation may not proceed by article 78 but must bring a declaratory judgment
action . . . . That is the law. Cases to this effect are legion.” Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at
443 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Albany, 512
N.E.2d 526, 529 (N.Y. 1987); Bd. of Educ. v. Gootnick, 404 N.E.2d 1318, 1319 (N.Y.
1980); Press v. County of Monroe, 409 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1980); Solnick v. Whalen,
401 N.E.2d 190, 195 (N.Y. 1980); Lakeland Water Dist. v. Onondaga County Water
Auth., 248 N.E.2d 855, 857 (N.Y. 1969).
151
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 436-37. The Majority cited two cases allegedly
supporting this proposition, one from 1936 and the other from 1900. Id.; see Carow v.
Bd. of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 6 N.E.2d 47 (N.Y. 1936); People ex rel. Balcom v.
Mosher, 57 N.E. 88 (N.Y. 1900). The Dissent noted that no language in either opinion
constituted such a holding of the Court. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 444 n.6 (Rosenblatt,
J., dissenting). Further, the cited cases predate the consolidation of writ practice
under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 and the subsequent case law on Article 78 proceedings. See
infra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
152
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 436-37.
153
Id. at 435; see discussion infra Part III.C.2.
154
Id. at 442-44 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
155
Id. at 444.
156
Id. at 446.
157
Id. at 444.
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“[t]o the dissent, the question was not merely one of procedure,
but of constitutional dimension.”158
1. The Procedural Issue
The Dissent did not reach the preemption issue, but
rather recommended the resumption of the previously initiated
action for declaratory judgment.159 This was not a mere
procedural formality; it was an explicit recognition of the
inadequacy of an Article 78 special proceeding to resolve
challenges to the validity of legislative enactments.160 The
history and purpose of Article 78 proceedings supports this
position.
New York codified the common law writ practice in
1921, and consolidated the procedure for these orders under
Article 78 of the former Civil Practice Act in 1937.161 Pursuant
to this Act (and its successor, Article 78 of the CPLR), petitions
for the major common law writs must be brought in a special
The purpose of
proceeding as defined by the Article.162
establishing a unified procedure was to provide a simplified
and expeditious method by which a petitioner could assert a
right to relief.163 Because most of these matters involve
relatively straightforward assertions of a legal right,164 Article
78 cases are heard as “special proceedings.”165 Generally, a
special proceeding entails limited opportunity for discovery166
and presentation of evidence167 compared with an action. In a
simple Article 78 proceeding, the court, having received the
158

Reardon & McGarry, supra note 17, at 3.
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 447 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
160
Id. at 446 (“This distinction between Article 78 and declaratory judgment
is critical and must be maintained if we are to preserve proper methods of
constitutional analysis. This goes to more than form. In the case before us, it
implicates separation of powers.”).
161
6 N.Y. JUR .2D, Article 78 and Related Proceedings § 1 (1997).
162
Id. The Article comprises petitions for the writs of mandamus, certiorari to
review, and prohibition. Id.
163
Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book
7B, CPLR C7801:1, at 25 (1994).
164
DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE 904 (3d ed. 1999).
165
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7804(a) (McKinney 1994). For general rules governing
special proceedings, see id., art. 4.
166
Id. § 408 (McKinney 2001) (requiring leave of court for disclosure in most
circumstances); SIEGEL, supra note 164, at 914,
167
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7804(d); SIEGEL, supra note 164, at 940 (“Most Article 78
proceedings are resolved on papers alone,” but if there is a triable issue of fact, then a
trial should be held.).
159
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parties’ papers, disposes of the case as it would a motion for
summary judgment.168 However, the CPLR accommodates
cases that require a more fully developed record.169 For
example, a court must determine if there is a triable issue of
fact warranting an evidentiary hearing.170 In fact, a full
panoply of options is available to a court hearing an Article 78
matter—including conversion to an action for declaratory
judgment.171
This kind of simplified procedure, involving only a
handful of petitions, affidavits, and pleadings is ill suited to the
practice of judicial review. Yet the Appellate Division relied on
nothing more when it declared the EBL invalid.172 A limited
proceeding without an evidentiary hearing is inconsistent with
the standard of review employed to challenge legislative acts.173
Statutes are accorded presumptive validity in New York
State.174 In order to prevail on a claim that a law is facially
invalid, a challenger must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt”
that in “‘any degree and in every conceivable application’ the
law suffers wholesale constitutional impairment.”175 A factual
record developed from a full hearing should thus be seen as the
bare minimum of due process when New York courts undertake
the act of judicial review. As the Bloomberg Dissent noted,
application of this stringent burden is substantially
undermined—and the presumptive validity of legislative acts
compromised—when a court decides the issue summarily and
without the benefit of a record.176 “This distinction between
article 78 and declaratory judgment is critical . . . .”177 Had the
168
Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book
7B, CPLR C7804:9, at 664 (1994); see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 409(b) (McKinney 2001).
169
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7804(d).
170
Id. § 7804(h) (“If a triable issue of fact is raised in a proceeding under this
article, it shall be tried forthwith.”). “The ‘forthwith’ directive is consistent with the
summary nature and purpose of Article 78 proceedings and, in effect, creates a trial
preference.” Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book
7B, CPLR C7804:9, at 664 (1994).
171
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 103(c) (McKinney 2003).
172
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 445 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
173
Id. at 446.
174
20 N.Y. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 60 (2005). Municipal ordinances are
granted the same deference. Lighthouse Shores, Inc. v. Town of Islip, 359 N.E.2d 337
(N.Y. 1976).
175
See, e.g., Moran Towing Corp. v. Urbach, 787 N.E.2d 624, 627 (N.Y. 2003)
(citations omitted); Cohen v. State, 720 N.E.2d 850, 852 (N.Y. 1999) (quoting McGowan
v. Burstein, 525 N.E.2d 710, 711 (N.Y. 1998)).
176
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 446 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
177
Id.
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matter been litigated under the Mayor’s original declaratory
judgment action, the Council would almost certainly have had
the opportunity for a full hearing to proffer evidence in support
of its case.178 The Appellate Division and Court of Appeals
failed to require the development of a record, which would be
essential to properly adjudicating the legality of the EBL under
a standard of presumptive validity.
2. The Preemption Issue
The Majority confidently asserted that no record was
necessary because the matter turned “entirely on issues of law,
not of fact.”179 However, it then proceeded to make factual
assumptions and narrow constructions of law in its analysis of
the preemption issue with regard to New York’s competitive
bidding statute and federal ERISA legislation.180
a. The Competitive Bidding Statute
The competitive bidding statute was enacted by New
York State to impose fiscal discipline on public expenditures
and to prevent “favoritism, improvidence, fraud and corruption
in the awarding of public contracts.”181 It provides that all
public works contracts over a certain cost threshold “shall be
awarded . . . to the lowest-responsible bidder . . . except as
otherwise expressly provided by an act of the legislature”182
To rebut the statute’s alleged preemption of the EBL,
the Council first relied on a legislative provision that it argued
This enactment—an
fell within the exception clause.183
implementing statute of a constitutional Home Rule
provision—allows localities to regulate the “wages or salaries,
the hours of work or labor, and the protection, welfare and
178

The merits of the preemption arguments inveighed against the EBL turn
on controverted material facts, as discussed infra in Part III.C.2. Although it is
possible that the trial court could have summarily dismissed the case against the
Council, it seems unlikely if the facts were viewed in the light most favorable to it, as
required by the applicable standard. See id.
179
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 437.
180
Id. at 438-42.
181
See N.Y. State Chapter, Inc. v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 666 N.E.2d 185,
190 (N.Y. 1996).
182
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 103(1) (McKinney 1994). For commentary on who
qualifies as a “responsible bidder,” see 27 N.Y. JUR. 2D Counties, Towns & Municipal
Corps. § 1357 (2001).
183
Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 30-38.
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safety of persons employed by any contractor or subcontractor
performing work, labor or services for it.”184 The Council
believed the EBL, by merely “set[ting] certain terms and
conditions upon which New York City will choose to do
business with private contractors,” fit comfortably within this
granted power and thus was consistent with the text of the
competitive bidding statute’s exception.185
In addition, based on data from other major cities with
similar laws, the Council asserted that the economic costs of
enacting the EBL would be de minimis, and the law would
ultimately yield financial benefits to the City.186 Thus, despite
a possible small increase in costs for City-contracted services
due to a reduction in the number of eligible bidders, the
Council anticipated financial gains overall.187 Therefore, the
Council argued, the EBL did not counteract the fiscal purpose
of the competitive-bidding statute.188
Finally, the Council sought refuge in a similar
established exception to the lowest-responsible bidder
requirement: actions for the purpose of bringing economic
benefits to the contracting authority.189 While the Council
184
N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(a)(10) (McKinney 1994); see N.Y.
CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(ii)(9); see also N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 30 (granting the Council
powers to review city contracting policies and practices, including “fair employment
practices of city contractors”).
185
Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 31-32 (citing McMillen v. Browne, 200
N.E.2d 546 (N.Y. 1964)). In McMillen, the Court used similar language in upholding
the imposition of a local minimum wage law for city contractors. McMillen, 200 N.E.2d
at 548.
186
Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 38-42. The City argued that providing
equal benefits would enable employers to recruit the best and brightest employees;
also, the State Comptroller testified to the Council that a reduction in public
healthcare costs could result, as more employers would be likely to extend health
insurance coverage to domestic partners. Id. at 39-40.
187
Id. at 31-42.
188
Id. As for the anti-corruption rationale for the competitive bidding law, the
intent was to prevent fraud in the contracting process in the form of quid pro quo
favoritism and other “sweetheart deals” by governmental procurement officials. Frank
Anechiarico & James B. Jacobs, Purging Corruption from Public Contracting: The
“Solutions” Are Now Part of the Problem, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 143, 145-46 (1995).
Indeed, the target of this facet of the law in New York City would be the Mayor’s office,
which has the authority to choose among contractors to the extent that discretion is
allowed. See generally id. The Mayor did not contend that the EBL was preempted on
these grounds, Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 22-23, Council of N.Y. v.
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 115214/04), 2005 WL 3818163 [hereinafter
Council’s Reply Brief], yet the Majority implausibly suggested such general provisions
as the EBL risked favoritism on the part of the Council in the awarding of contracts,
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 438 (“[T]he municipality could design its requirements to
match the benefit structure of the bidder it favored.”).
189
See N.Y. State Chapter, Inc., v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 666 N.E.2d 185,
190 (N.Y. 1996) (determinative question was whether the public authority’s labor
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readily admitted that a primary motivation to pass the EBL
was to pursue social change, it always maintained that
“procuring cheaper, higher quality goods and services for the
City” was another basic objective.190 Since the EBL arguably
promoted such benefits that advance the same interests as
embodied by the competitive bidding statute, the laws were not
in conflict.191 The Court of Appeals flatly rejected the Council’s
assertions in this regard without providing a basis for doing
so.192
b. ERISA
The Court’s finding that the EBL was preempted by
ERISA was based on the following broad provision of the
federal act: “‘[ERISA] shall supersede any and all state laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan [described herein].”193 The Council argued, first,
that the nature of the EBL excluded it from ERISA preemption
as construed by both New York and federal courts, and, second,
that the Council’s enactment fell within the “market
participant” exception.194
In Chesterfield Associates v. New York State Department
of Labor, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the state
agency’s compensation calculation method in its enforcement of
New York State’s prevailing wage law (which compels
contractors engaged in public works to pay their employees a
prevailing wage).195 The Court cited Burgio and Campofelice,
Inc. v. New York State Department of Labor, a Second Circuit
case that held “ERISA does not preempt the . . . [prevailing
wage] law because it does not mandate a particular set of
benefits.”196 The Burgio opinion quoted the U.S. Supreme
agreement “had as its purpose and likely effect the advancement of the interests
embodied in the competitive bidding statutes”).
190
Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 7.
191
Id. at 29-31.
192
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 439 (“[T]he Council cannot and does not
seriously assert that the ‘purpose and likely effect’ of the law is to make the City’s
contracts cheaper or their performance more efficient.”). Evidently the Council’s
arguments that the EBL would both yield better performance and ultimately protect
the public fisc fell on deaf ears. See Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 41-42.
193
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
194
Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 44-46.
195
Chesterfield Assocs. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 830 N.E.2d 287 (N.Y.
2005).
196
Id. at 290 n.4 (citing Burgio & Campofelice, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of
Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 1007 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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Court: “Preemption does not occur, however, if the state law
has only a ‘tenuous, remote, or peripheral’ connection with
covered plans . . . .”197 The EBL did not require particular
benefits or any type of plan; it did not even mandate that all
employers provide the equal benefits it championed, merely
that contractors who opted to bid for city contracts over
$100,000 do so.198 The Council contended, therefore, that the
law was not preempted by ERISA because it did not regulate
any particular benefit and had only a peripheral effect on
covered plans.199 The Majority ignored this line of reasoning
entirely and only directly addressed the Council’s market
participant exception argument.200
A market participant exception to ERISA may exist
when a state or its subdivision acts as a participant in the
marketplace.201 The exception applies when such an entity acts
to advance its proprietary interests, but not when it acts as a
regulator.202 The Council’s argument here echoed that of its
position on the competitive bidding statute in that economic
interests did in part underlie the motivation to pass the EBL.203
The Court in Bloomberg, however, narrowly construed the
market participant exception, restricting its application to
instances where the state acts exclusively for the purpose of
protecting a proprietary interest, with “no interest in setting
policy.”204 The Majority’s view is that even if the Council had a

197

Burgio, 107 F.3d at 1008 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,
100 n.21 (1983)). The Burgio court further stated that areas of traditional state
regulation are not preempted unless there is an indication of congressional intent. Id.
(citing N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 654-55 (1995)).
198
New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 27 (2004).
199
Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 44-45.
200
See Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 441.
201
See, e.g., Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders &
Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1993) (commonly referred to as
Boston Harbor).
202
Id.
203
Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 46-52.
204
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 442 (quoting Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 229)
(emphasis added). Despite the borrowed phrase from Boston Harbor, the Court’s
absolutist position is not supported by the Supreme Court’s opinion. The quote was
taken from a section comparing a state’s market influence with that of a private entity;
it reads in full, “These distinctions are far less significant when the State acts as a
market participant with no interest in setting policy.” Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 229.
Nowhere did the Supreme Court hold that the state’s purpose must be utterly devoid of
a regulatory purpose when it operates in conjunction with an economic one. As the
Council noted, the Ninth Circuit upheld the San Francisco law analogous to the EBA
under the market participant exception. Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 49-50
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legitimate economic basis for enacting the provision, the
ERISA preemption exception would be unavailable because the
EBL also had a social policy purpose.205 This interpretation of
the market participant exception is needlessly restrictive when
it precludes any law that contains a non-fiscal component. It is
also unclear how a court should evaluate the “purity” of a
legislature’s motivation given the often unwieldy deliberative
process.
The persuasiveness of most of the Council’s arguments
against preemption turns on findings of fact, including the
purposes and likely effects of the EBL. As such, the Court’s
willingness to uphold the Appellate Division’s dismissal of the
petition without providing an opportunity for a full evidentiary
hearing may be seen as an egregious encroachment on the
rights of the City Council.206
IV.

REPERCUSSIONS OF BLOOMBERG

Disputes between executive and legislative bodies in
New York governments are inevitable as political actors pursue
their own agendas, but the Bloomberg ruling has changed the
ground rules for these conflicts.
Although the ultimate
outcome of Bloomberg may or may not have been just (a full
hearing could well have ended with the same result), the case
is likely to be remembered for the presumptuous judicial
response to the dispute and the potential adverse effects of the
Court’s ruling. The Court’s decision disturbs the balance of
power between the legislatures and executives under its
jurisdiction.207 Given its extraordinary power of judicial review,
the judiciary plays a special role in maintaining the power

(citing Air Transp. Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D.
Cal. 1998)).
205
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 441-42.
206
This is not to say that the Court necessarily ought to have granted the
Council’s requested relief. While it is plausible that the uncertainty over either case
for preemption would be sufficient to defeat the “clear right” standard applicable to a
mandamus proceeding, it is far less certain that the presumptive validity accorded
legislative acts would be overcome. Neither the Appellate Division’s two paragraphs
nor the somewhat lengthier consideration by the Court of Appeals seemed to apply the
stringent standard of review that would apply in a declaratory judgment action, see
supra Part III.C.1, or even one appropriate for dismissing an Article 78 petition, in
which all factual inferences should be taken in the petitioner’s favor. See Council’s
Reply Brief, supra note 188, at 15 (citing 511 W. 32nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty
Co., 773 N.E.2d 496 (N.Y. 2002)).
207
See Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 444 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
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balance among governmental branches.208 Bloomberg provides
an example of how an ill-considered decision can effect a shift
in the governmental balance of power. It is an especially
troubling case because the alteration of established judicial
procedure was both unnecessary and unjust.
A.

The Separation of Powers Issues

The Bloomberg decision signals a significant shift of
power from legislatures to executives in New York State. This
transgression of separation of powers was precipitated by the
failure of the customary checks and balances to manage an
interbranch conflict, and ratified by a high court decision that
burdens one branch to the benefit of another. In effect, the
Court legitimated the Mayor’s unilateral (in)action in direct
opposition both to the Council’s overriding veto as well as to
the Supreme Court’s denial of the temporary restraining
order.209 Although the Court’s later holding vindicated the
Mayor’s view that the EBL was invalid, the Mayor’s refusal to
enforce a duly enacted law disrupted the law-making
machinery instituted by the City Charter.210 By deciding that
the EBL was preempted without the benefit of an evidentiary
hearing, the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals strayed
from customary procedures for determining the validity of a
challenged enactment.211 In light of the foreseeable detrimental
effects of taking this extraordinary judicial action, the Courts
failed to observe a proper respect for the separation of powers
doctrine.212 The assertion of unwarranted authority by the
executive and the abnegation of the responsibility of both the
executive and the judiciary to act with deference to coordinate
branches threaten to undermine the capacity of legislative
bodies in the state to represent their constituents.

208

See Cohen v. State of New York, 720 N.E.2d 850, 854 (N.Y. 1999) (citing
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)) (“The courts are vested with a
unique role and review power over the constitutionality of legislation.”).
209
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 437 (“Where a local law seems to the Mayor to
conflict with a state or federal one, the Mayor’s obligation is to obey the latter . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
210
See id. at 443 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
211
See supra Part III.C.1.
212
Brennan Ctr. Brief, supra note 122, at 10.
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1. How New York’s Legislative Bodies Have Been
Weakened by Bloomberg
Bloomberg is a case in which the usual mechanisms that
govern the boundaries of interbranch action failed. First, the
Council’s power to override a mayoral veto was nullified when
the Charter’s provision for automatic enactment was annulled
by the Mayor’s refusal to enforce the law. Mayor Bloomberg
objected to the EBL on both policy and legal grounds.213 Those
two different bases invoke separate courses of action within the
Mayor’s granted authority, the veto214 and a legal challenge.215
The executive branch has no special authority to ignore a law
that furthers a policy with which the executive disagrees;
rather, he or she has a sworn duty to uphold and execute the
law.216 In this case, after the Council overrode the veto and the
court denied him an injunction, the Mayor went beyond any
right or remedy available to his office by refusing to implement
the EBL, enacted by the veto override.217 He defied the system
of checks and balances by acting on his unilateral judgment of
the EBL’s legal status.218
By sanctioning this executive branch overreach,
Bloomberg subverted the existing power balance between the
Mayor’s office and the Council.219 Allowing New York courts to
address the validity of a law as a defense in an Article 78
proceeding grants de facto executive officeholders an extraconstitutional alternative to thwart legislative will.220 By
213

Tavernise, supra note 127.
N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 37.
215
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 442 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (“An executive is
authorized to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging an enactment’s
constitutionality . . . .”).
216
Id. at 443.
217
Id. at 447.
218
A contrary view of the propriety of executive action upon an independent
determination of a law’s validity is contemplated in Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993). Paulsen argues that a conception of separation of powers
that subordinates executive authority to judicial review is inconsistent with the
granting of executive powers that may be exercised without regard for legal precedent
or justification, such as the ability to pardon or veto legislation for any reason
whatsoever. Id. at 81-83. However, this Note takes the position that this tension
dissolves when these “extraordinary” powers are understood to be the very mechanisms
of the doctrine that define each branch’s authority in a balanced system of carefully
allocated power. See discussion supra Part II.B.
219
Winnie Hu, Mayor Need Not Enforce Certain Laws, Court Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at B3 (citing legal experts).
220
Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 16-17.
214
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simply refusing to administer an enactment and mounting a
legal defense to actions initiated by the legislative branch, an
executive can at least delay and possibly evade implementing a
policy. Imagine the Court in Bloomberg decided the case in the
Council’s favor.
Then, the Mayor’s inaction would have
“illegally” affected city contracting transactions for over a year.
As a practical matter, the beneficial inducement effect of the
law over that time period would never be realized, and the
indirect financial gains anticipated from the measure further
delayed. Not only might significant costs result, but more
fundamentally it would represent a failure of the democratic
process to carry out the people’s bidding.221
By encouraging this very course of action, Bloomberg
augments the power of executives in the state at the expense of
legislative bodies. “As things turned out, the Court of Appeals
gave executive officials of the local and state governments of
New York a significant procedural advantage for the resolution
of disputes with legislative bodies over allegedly invalid
legislation.”222 Executives may now sit back and do nothing
while preparing to meet legal action initiated by the legislative
body, thereby placing an added burden on the legislative
branch simply to have its enactments put into effect.223 The
executive would thereby force the legislature to expend
additional resources merely to exercise its granted powers.224
Such executive recalcitrance saps the full effectiveness of the
legislative body. In some cases, it can be expected that
legislators will be deterred altogether from undertaking a legal
battle over a contested enactment due to the expense. Thus,
the will of the legislative body, and its constituents, may at
times be utterly thwarted.
While it is true that an executive may pay a political
price for opposing popular measures in this manner, the
effectiveness of this check varies with the timing of the election
cycle and the relative importance of the pertinent issue in the
221

Brennan Ctr. Brief, supra note 122, at 6.
Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book
7B, CPLR C7801:5, at 4-5 (Supp. 2007).
223
See Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 443 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (“[I]t should
not be necessary for [the Council] to start a lawsuit saying, in effect, ‘We’ve passed the
law and really meant it . . . .’”).
224
Moreover, there appears to be little cost for executives who adopt this
approach. If they eventually are unsuccessful in the courts, the likely effect would be
no more than an order to enforce the law from that point forward. While they may pay
a price at the polls (assuming their position is an unpopular one, since a supermajority
of legislators opposed it), the result is still, at best, justice delayed.
222
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voters’ decision-making process. Others might defend an
executive’s ability to act on his or her own legal determination
as a desirable means by which to counteract an improvident
exercise of legislative power. Regardless of the wisdom of this
approach, such executive encroachment into legislative power
is inconsistent with the separation of powers embodied in the
state constitution. Governors in New York have the express
obligation to enforce the laws that have been put into effect by
a veto override.225 The same, of course, goes for New York City
mayors under its charter.226
2. The Nature of the Harm Threatened
The harmful effects of Bloomberg arise from the
increased risk that legitimate enactments of law may be
delayed or indeed never see the light of day. When a legitimate
law-making process is hampered, the public loses the full force
of its most representative voice, and when such laws are
erroneously stuck down, this voice is not only weakened, but
completely silenced.
This danger may be enhanced by judicial error or bias.
When courts address the validity of a law in limited
proceedings, the result may well be that some enactments will
be struck down that might not have been had their proponents
received a full hearing. It is at least arguable that this was the
result in Bloomberg.227 The same result could also occur if a
judiciary that is sympathetic to the executive’s position
improperly intrudes upon the political sphere under the pretext
of assessing a law’s validity in order to stifle legislative action
and the people’s will.
Another detrimental effect of this failure to respect the
separation of powers is a heightening of interbranch tensions.
As discussed above, the Bloomberg precedent increases the
likelihood for similar acts of executive encroachment in the
future. Beyond the practical burdens placed on legislative
bodies to have their laws enforced, increased frustration and
animosity between branches are predictable results.
Adversarial relations between the legislative and executive
bodies are damaging to good governance, as the branches must

225
226
227

N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 37.
See supra Part III.C.2.
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work together to work at all.228 Recognition of this potential for
unhealthy conflict warrants the exercise of greater deference.
B.

Bloomberg’s Heedless and Dangerous Precedent

What is remarkable about Bloomberg is that there was
no need to levy this insult upon the separation of powers
doctrine. Because mandamus relief should be granted only
when the petitioner is due a clear legal right, there is no reason
why the instant courts could not have dismissed the Council’s
petition and let the declaratory judgment action deal with the
issue of the EBL’s validity separately. As one state court has
cautioned, “[the] Petitioner’s right to obtain an order of
mandamus rests in the sound discretion of the court . . . and
the court’s power should be exercised cautiously when to do so
will interfere with the functions of co-equal branches of
government.”229 The Court’s abuse of Article 78 procedure in
this case was unnecessary, unfair, and, notwithstanding the
disposition of this case, may well exacerbate inefficiencies in
similar adjudication.
1. The Judiciary’s Unnecessary Procedural Shortcut
The Court’s decision in Bloomberg was unwarranted
because an unequivocally appropriate recourse existed to
resolve the dispute—to restore the Mayor’s original declaratory
judgment action.230 The Court need not have decided the law’s
validity in order to dismiss the mandamus petition; instead, it
could have based the dismissal on the failure of the Council to
establish that it had a “clear legal right” to relief.231 Thereafter,
the declaratory judgment action on the preemption issue could
resume. The only justification given for the course taken, by
both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals, was the
interest of efficiency, to dispense with the case without further

228
See Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 22-23. The authors comment that
a benefit of incorporating multiple government actors in the decision-making process is
the encouragement of consensus-building; the downside, of course, is that fractious
relations can interfere with the operation of government. See id. at 14-15 (discussing
some scholars’ critique of divided government leading to “needless institutional conflict,
division, and gridlock”).
229
Williams v. Bryant, 395 N.Y.S.2d 552 (App. Div. 1977).
230
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 444 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
231
See supra note 138.
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proceedings.232 This argument turns the concept of Article 78
expediency on its head, however. Streamlining of the writ
practice was not intended to relieve court dockets, but rather to
benefit claimants pursuing their rights in the face of
governmental abuse or inaction.233 Placing writ practice within
the purview of special proceedings was a recognition that, for
many cases, a ruling on the papers was all that was needed,
not that it was all that was due.234 Thus, courts are instructed
to convert Article 78 and other special proceedings into full
actions whenever appropriate, and hearings on issues of
material fact are to be held whenever they arise.235 Reinstating
the Mayor’s action for declaratory judgment would have been
consistent with this policy.
Nor can it persuasively be argued that there is a danger
in maintaining the status quo rule. The Majority in Bloomberg
asserted that validity must be examined in a mandamus case
lest a truly detestable (and clearly unconstitutional) act be
perpetrated upon the people.236 They proffered an example of a
legislature that passes a law requiring racial segregation in
public schools, and argued that it would be absurd to preclude
a court from striking such a law, even in an Article 78
setting.237 Even if one considers such an extreme case (which
could only arise if a legislative supermajority rammed through
such an odious, obviously unconstitutional, or patently
dangerous measure), one would expect that an executive need
only move for a temporary restraining order, as Mayor
Bloomberg did for the EBL.238 The difference is that in the
hypothetical scenario, the court would be certain to grant the
motion, and any potential harm would be averted.239

232

Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 791 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (App. Div. 2005);
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 437-38.
233
SIEGEL, supra note 167, at 904 (“A special proceeding is a quick and
inexpensive way to implement a right.”). See also Rockwell v. Morris, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25
(App. Div. 1961).
234
SIEGEL, supra note 167, at 904-05.
235
Id. at 905.
236
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 436-37.
237
Id. at 437.
238
Id. at 443 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
239
If this nefarious conspiracy had infected the judicial branch as well, then—
and only then—would the author agree that unitary action by the executive is
warranted. The distinction lies in the degree of harm threatened and the true
incompatibility of the offensive enactment with existing bodies of law (rather than a
mere debatable inconsistency). The hypothetical is far from the scenario in Bloomberg,
however, or any other likely to arise.
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2. The Injustice of the Court’s Ruling
The procedural shortcut taken by the Bloomberg Court
inflicted an unfair disadvantage on the City Council for the act
of vigilantly pursuing its rights. If the Council had not filed
the Article 78 petition in response to the Mayor’s refusal to
enforce the law, it would likely have had a full evidentiary
hearing on the validity of the EBL in the previously filed
declaratory judgment action.240 Instead, as a petitioner seeking
mandamus to compel, it was inappropriately put in the position
of defending the law’s validity in a limited proceeding.241 The
Court effectively punished the party seeking that the rule of
law be observed.242 This decision will undoubtedly deter a
legislative body from employing the mandamus writ (which in
some circumstances would be the appropriate vehicle) to
achieve this purpose. Instead, if the executive simply refuses
to act at all (as is now undeniably the best strategy), the
legislative body will have to seek a declaratory judgment if it
wants to ensure it receives a full hearing. This is problematic
for the reasons discussed above: the remedy will necessarily be
improperly delayed,243 and the attendant costs could deter the
action altogether.
3. The Courts’ Flawed Efficiency Rationale
The expediency of dispensing with customary procedure
in Bloomberg could end up being counterproductive. The
Majority rejected as a “purposeless exercise” the Dissent’s
argument that the declaratory judgment action be resumed to
consider the validity of the EBL.244 They noted that Article 78
proceedings are designed for prompt resolution, and concluded
that the issue of the EBL’s validity could be decided as a
matter of law.245 This concern for judicial efficiency may be not
240

See supra Part III.C.1.
Brennan Ctr. Brief, supra note 122, at 9-10.
242
See id. at 10 (arguing that the Mayor should not be permitted to raise the
validity of the EBL even as a defense because he effectively forced the Council to bring
the Article 78 proceeding through his inaction).
243
The legislative body could seek a preliminary injunction ordering the
executive to comply with the law, but, as demonstrated in Bloomberg, there is no way
to enforce such an order if the executive simply refuses to acknowledge the decision.
(An Article 78 petition in the nature of a mandamus to compel compliance with the
injunction springs to mind, but we can imagine what the defense would be.)
244
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 437-38.
245
Id. at 437.
241
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only misapplied,246 but also misconceived, because the holding
may lead to less efficient adjudication of similar disputes.
A predictable outcome from this decision is
multiplicative adjudication. The Court granted discretionary
authority to courts hearing Article 78 proceedings to go beyond
the scope comprehended by the CPLR.247 Instead of deciding
merely whether the petitioner has a clear legal right to an
action by a body or officer under the law, courts may now opt to
pass judgment on the validity of the underlying law in such a
proceeding when it is raised as a defense.248 To do so, they
must first decide whether or not evidentiary hearings or
conversion to a declaratory judgment action is appropriate.
Presumably, in some cases, courts will decline to exercise
either of these options, and this decision would be reviewable
on appeal for abuse of discretion. If the determination is found
to be erroneous, the likely result is remand with an order to
take the necessary action. This needless delay in adjudication
and potentially unnecessary involvement of the Appellate
Division is an inefficient use of judicial resources.
The adjudication of a law’s validity entails standards
and procedures established by statutes and the common law.249
Parties should not be able to circumvent this authority merely
as a result of their defensive posture in an Article 78
proceeding. Bypassing the established process in a case such
as Bloomberg is not supported by arguments for efficiency,
fairness, or necessity. The Court has thus needlessly imposed
an added burden on New York legislatures, which has the
direct consequence of impeding their ability to vigorously
represent the will of their constituents.

246
As discussed previously, the efficiency of special proceedings was primarily
intended to benefit claimants, not the courts. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
247
The CPLR identifies the only four questions that may be determined in an
Article 78 proceeding, which relate to the purposes of the common law writs and do not
include statutory review. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803 (McKinney 1994).
248
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 437.
249
See supra Part III.C.1.
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PROSPECTS FOR MITIGATING BLOOMBERG’S
DELETERIOUS EFFECTS

The Court of Appeals’ decision in Bloomberg cannot be
appealed and is not likely to be revisited any time soon.250
Therefore, executives in New York have the Court’s
imprimatur to act upon their unilateral decisions concerning
the validity of laws, and trial courts have been given an
invitation to bypass previously established procedures to
adjudicate those disputes. As an immediate response, this
Note urges these actors to exercise deference to legislatures by
foregoing those paths. A more forceful solution to the problem
would be for the state legislature to amend the CPLR to
preclude adjudication of a law’s validity without providing an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing (subject to the usual
threshold standard of summary judgment).
A.

Deference of Coordinate Branches

The separation of powers doctrine is not an end to itself,
but the means to ensure the best, most representative
government possible.251 Government actors can only properly
advance this goal by refraining from encroachment upon
coordinate branches.252 These restraints on power do not
render governmental branches powerless to influence
coordinate branches; they may pursue both political and legal
avenues of advocacy and redress. But actions that breach the
accepted limits on power, as put forth in foundational
documents, are offensive to democratic rule and should not be
embarked upon.
In the case of the EBL, Mayor Bloomberg is not to be
faulted for asserting his good faith position that the law was
preempted by the state and federal statutes. An executive
ought to pursue his or her interests vigorously, but every
government officer is irrevocably obligated to uphold the rule of
law. Mayor Bloomberg overstepped the power imbued in the
executive office by ignoring the law after the veto override and

250
There are no issues of federal law implicated that would permit an appeal
in federal court. See MARK DAVIES, MARIANNE STECICH & RISA I. GOLD, NEW YORK
CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE § 2.2 (West 1996).
251
See discussion supra Part II.A.
252
See, e.g., 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 250 (1998) (addressing
both federal and state contexts).
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the denial of the temporary injunction.253 At that point, the
legislative and judicial branches had spoken, and the Charter’s
mandate allowed the Mayor no discretion to act to the contrary,
at least until the courts had an opportunity to address the
matter in litigation.254 However, there is no mechanism in the
current system that can force this compliance—nothing more,
that is, than the deference owed to a popularly elected,
coordinate branch of government.255 As Justice Burger wrote,
the “hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to
accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted.”256
Similarly, in cases and controversies implicating the
separation of powers, the judiciary ought to adopt the
deferential posture of a coequal branch of government.257 Going
forward, New York courts may yet adhere to this constraint by
refusing to follow the course set in Bloomberg. Although they
are required to consider the validity of a statute when the issue
is raised as a defense in an Article 78 proceeding, they have the
authority under the CPLR to take whatever measures may be
necessary to assure that triable issues of fact receive a full
hearing.258 This power includes converting the proceeding to an
action for declaratory judgment.259 By doing so, the court would
simply utilize the statutory means to settle these disputes.
This includes application of the standards and presumptions
normally afforded legislative enactments. Legislatures and
253
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 447 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (“Just as a
judicial ‘injunction must be obeyed until modified or dissolved, and its
unconstitutionality is no defense to disobedience’ . . . , duly enacted legislation must be
enforced by the executive branch and its alleged invalidity is no defense.” (quoting
Metro. Opera Assoc., Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int’l Union,
239 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 2001))).
254
Id.
255
See Southwick, supra note 45, at 935 (quoting U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he ‘absence of structural mechanisms to
require those officials to [restrain from encroachment], and the momentary political
convenience often attendant upon their failure to do so,’ leads to temptation . . . .”)). In
Lopez, Justice Kennedy argued that this lack of safeguards may justify judicial
intervention when one of the political branches failed to maintain the constitutional
balance. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
256
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
257
Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 40. However, other problems arise
when judicial deference is exercised in favor of one branch over another. See Neal
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from
Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2321 (2006).
258
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7804(h) (McKinney 1994).
259
See id. § 103(c); Kovarsky v. Hous. and Dev. Admin. of the City of N.Y., 286
N.E.2d 882, 885-86 (N.Y. 1972).
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their constituents are owed nothing less, regardless of the
procedural context in which the challenge arises.
Because of its unique role as final arbiter of what the
law is, the judiciary occupies a singular place within our
This special role is
system of divided government.260
highlighted in the face of executive-legislative branch conflicts.
To this extent, judicial review somewhat belies the theory that
no branch is superior to the others.261 While this power has
been controversial since the time of Marbury v. Madison, it is
beyond question that there is an expectation that the judiciary
bears an enhanced responsibility to maintain and uphold
separation of powers principles.262
However, in their ambitious re-articulation of
separation of powers theory, Peabody and Nugent expressed
great wariness of the judiciary’s role in resolving such
disputes.263 Nevertheless, they recognize its appropriateness in
some circumstances, and advocate a deliberate approach.264
They recommend, first, that courts resist early intervention, in
order to allow the parties to negotiate a resolution or at least
“to construct an adequate record for judges to assess.”265
Second, where the political system has run its course and
courts find themselves adjudicating these conflicts, the
judiciary “should attempt self-consciously to address how its
ruling will affect the various levels at which the separation of
powers operate.”266 The Majority in Bloomberg failed to act
with anything remotely resembling this degree of care. At a
260
See, e.g., Cohen v. State of N.Y., 720 N.E.2d 850, 854 (N.Y. 1999) (citing
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
261
See generally Robert J. Reinstein & Mark C. Rahdert, Reconstructing
Marbury, 57 ARK. L. REV. 729 (2005). In the federal context, see United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-04 (1974) (“[T]he Court has authority to interpret claims with
respect to powers alleged to derive from enumerated powers.”).
262
MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 14; 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law
§ 250 (1998); see also Cohen, 720 N.E.2d at 854-55; WILSON, supra note 7, at 82-83.
263
Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 36-38. This prudence is premised in
part on their belief that among the salutary effects of distributed powers are the
opportunities afforded for negotiations and compromise between branches. Id. at 3940. It also rests upon the conclusion that courts often lack the requisite competence to
ascertain the true nature of core functions of the coordinate branches. Id. at 39.
Others have advocated the use of litigation for legislative-executive
clashes, where appropriate. E.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 38, at 15-16 (noting the utility
of an authoritative third-party mediator to avoid acrimonious conflicts); Garry, supra
note 4, at 689 (arguing for a more active judicial role in enforcing constitutionally
mandated separation of powers).
264
Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 40-42.
265
Id. at 40.
266
Id.
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minimum, appropriate deference would include the adherence
to established procedures of adjudication and standards of
review that were abandoned in this case.
B.

Legislative Action

The state legislature could easily address the concerns
raised in this Note by amending the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules. By revising the procedures for adjudicating
the validity of legislative acts, they could ensure that those
defending the validity of enactments receive a full and fair
hearing. A codification of the existing common law rule that a
petitioner may not challenge the validity of a law in an Article
78 proceeding267 could be modestly augmented by a rule that
requires courts to convert such a proceeding to an action for
declaratory judgment, upon a motion by the petitioner, when
the validity of the underlying law is raised as a defense. This
legislative fix would merely provide that in this particular
situation conversion would be a matter of right for the
petitioner.
Legislating a procedural rule change to remedy a
perceived injustice perpetuated by the judiciary is not a novel
approach. One precedent for such a legislative “overruling” can
be found in Congress’ 1992 Civil Rights Act.268 In Ward’s Cove
Packing Company v. Atonio, the Supreme Court altered its
allocation of the burden of proof in disparate-impact
discrimination claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.269 Previous to the ruling, a defendant employer had the
onus of proving that an employment practice was based solely
on a legitimate neutral consideration, but in Ward’s Cove the
Supreme Court placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove that
the employer’s proffered justification was invalid.270 Congress
reacted by using its legislative powers to set forth by statute
the requirements necessary for making a case of employment
discrimination in the absence of proof of intent.271 The New
York State legislature could take a similar step to ensure that
267

See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
CAMPBELL, supra note 38, at 161-63.
269
490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 5253 (2003).
270
CAMPBELL, supra note 38, at 162; see Ward’s Cove, 490 U.S. at 659-60.
271
CAMPBELL, supra note 38, at 12; see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105,
105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000)).
268
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judicial procedure ensures fairness in the adjudication of
legislative validity. The fact that legislative bodies are the
ones aggrieved by this decision ought to provide sufficient
motivation for such a response.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The constitutions (and charters) organizing government
structure reflect careful choices of power allocation. Especially
in the states, these foundational documents have been the
focus of various amendments as the people have sought to
improve the protections and the efficiencies of the political
systems under which they live.272 Government officers swear to
uphold these embodiments of the peoples’ will, and are thus
obliged to heed their guiding principles. Both the executive
and judicial branches in the Bloomberg conflict failed to respect
the separation of powers doctrine. The Mayor’s refusal to
enforce the Equal Benefits Law in the face of both the Council’s
overriding veto as well as a court judgment was an act in
excess of his authority.273 But the Court’s conduct was even
more damaging.274 When interbranch conflicts require judicial
intervention, courts must tread carefully because they are
entrusted with the ultimate authority to say what the law is
and what the constitution demands.275
The Bloomberg decision highlights important issues to
be considered when the machinery underlying the separation of
powers breaks down. The system of checks and balances
governs the interplay among the departments and proscribes
limits for each branch’s proper exercise of power.
The
effectiveness of these mechanisms depends on the good faith
efforts of political actors to observe and respect the limitations
imposed by separated government.276 Each department owes
due deference toward coordinate branches to the extent
reflected by these organizing principles, thereby ensuring
enactment of the democratic will tempered by procedural and
structural safeguards.
Unfortunately, both the executive and, especially, the
judicial branches involved in the EBL dispute failed to
272
273
274
275
276

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part IV.A.
Id.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part II.A.
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recognize, or failed to heed, their implied obligations under the
doctrine of separation of powers. Although the EBL may not
have fared any better as a result of these breaches of due
deference, the Court of Appeals has ratified Mayor Bloomberg’s
extra-legal disobedience to the benefit of New York State’s
executive officeholders.
The Court’s ruling ignored longstanding precedent that ensured the presumption of validity
accorded to legislative bodies by allowing the issue to be
conclusively determined in a limited special proceeding.277 In
doing so, it effected a significant shift in the balance of power
established by the state’s constitution.278 What is worse is that
this affront to democratic principles was entirely gratuitous.279
In Bloomberg, the Court not only failed to exhibit
adequate deference to coordinate branches by adhering to
established adjudicative procedures, but compounded the harm
by inviting the state’s courts to follow suit. These courts should
decline this invitation unless precautions are taken to assure a
full and fair hearing. Should the current state of affairs impair
the ability of law-making bodies in the state to perform their
duties, the New York State Legislature should amend the civil
practice rules to ensure that limited proceedings are not
exploited to circumvent due consideration of the validity of
their enactments.
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